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ISSUES PRESENTED
In his appeal from the trial court's decree of divorce, Respondent / Appellant Jeff
Hawks (aJefP5) presents two issues:
He claims that the trial court erred in awarding Petitioner / Appellee Jenifer
Hawks ("Jenifer") alimony without making a determination of her earning
capacity; and
He claims that the court erred in removing an expense which he had claimed in his
budget. The expense was for $400 per month for travel expenses.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
Hoagland v. Hoagland. 852 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah App. 1993)
Newman v. White Water Whirlpool 2008 U T 79, ^14,

P.3d

STATEMENT O F T H E CASE
This is a divorce case which ended a 35-year marriage. Jeff had worked
throughout the marriage and earned over $70,000 per year. Jenifer had been a housewife
throughout the marriage. Except for a brief part-time job caring for a nephew about ten
years before the end of the marriage, she had not worked outside the home since the
1970s.
Although the parties agreed on many of the issues, they could not agree on the
amount of alimony which Jeff should pay to Jenifer.

1

A trial was held in this matter on May 15, 2008. At the close of the trial, the court
took the matter u n d e r advisement. T h e next day the trial court m a d e a decision on the
matter in a video-recorded ruling. Copies of the ruling were sent to the attorneys for the
parties. As part of the court's ruling, it ordered Jeff to pay alimony of SI ,900 per month.
T h e court also excluded an expense which Jeff had claimed of $400 for travel expenses.
Following the trial court's ruling, Jeff's attorney prepared Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of L a w a n d a Decree of Divorce. T h e j u d g e signed those on July 2, 2008 and
they were entered the same day.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although the trial court did not make a finding regarding the exact amount that
Jenifer could earn, its findings on her ability to earn a living a n d her needs are sufficient to
meet the abuse of discretion standard. Furthermore, the trial court's decision to give
minimal weight to Jeff's expert testimony regarding Jenifer's earning potential was
reasonable given the expert's admission that she did not have an interview with Jenifer or
follow her usual practice in making an evaluation of Jenifer's earning potential.
T h e trial court's explained its decision to reduce Jeffs expenses by $400 in its
ruling of May 16, 2008. T h e fact that this was not included in the Findings of Fact and
the Conclusions of Law a n d the Decree is attributable to Jeff because his attorney was
assigned to prepare those documents. U n d e r the invited error doctrine, the court should
refuse to consider an assignment of error when the party w h o is complaining of the error
contributed to the alleged error.
2

ARGUMENT
In this appeal, Jeff raises two issues: 1) that the trial court erred by entering an
alimony order without making a determination of the amount that Jenifer could earn, and
2) that the trial court erred in removing one of Jeffs claimed expenses from his budget.
Neither of these claimed errors amounts to much and this court should affirm the order of
the trial court.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT MADE A SUFFICIENT FINDING OF
JENIFER'S EARNING CAPACITY.

Throughout the cases dealing with alimony, the appellate courts have stressed that
the determination of an alimony award is a fact-sensitive decision. See, e.g., Hoagland v.
Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah App. 1993) ("because the issue [of alimony] is
Tact-sensitive5 and because the court must consider call relevant facts and equitable
principles/ we defer to the court's sound discretion in determining the parties' standard of
living.55) (citing Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).
In making an alimony determination, the court must examine the factors listed in
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8), which are:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse; and

(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(a).
In addition, "the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles" in
making an alimony determination (Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(c)), and "The court may,
under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living" (Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(d)).
In making his arguments, Jeff focuses exclusively on paragraph (ii) of subsection (a),
which requires the trial court to consider the earning capacity of the recipient spouse. Jeff
takes the position that a court's findings on this matter are insufficient unless the court
makes a finding of the specific dollar amount which the recipient spouse could earn. This
position is unsupported by the text of the statute or either of the cases which he cites in
support of his argument on this issue. This position also discounts the importance of the
other factors which the court must consider in making an alimony determination and the
balancing of all of these factors in the intensely fact-specific determination of the amount
of alimony.
The facts show that in this matter the court did consider Jenifer's earning capacity
in making its alimony determination. In this matter, the best indication of the court's
consideration of the elements involved in its alimony determination is the video-recorded
ruling it made on May 16, the day following the trial. A transcript of this ruling is
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attached as Exhibit "A." In the ruling the court stated the following in making its
determination of alimony:
The only other issue before the Court is the issue of alimony.
The defendant makes approximately $82,000 per year, and the
Respondent — excuse me. The Petitioner makes, at this point zero. The
Respondent makes approximately $82,055. Petitioner argued that the — his
— that the Respondent's income ought to be split, and Petitioner -- or
Respondent argued that there ought to be some imputed income to her.
The court, as it looks at the budget, finds that the Respondent —
excuse me, the Petitioner has the ability to work and to earn some income,
and if the Respondent — or if the Court were to split the Respondent's
income right down the middle, that there would -- he would not have
sufficient income to satisfy his needs. It's like killing the goose that laid the
golden egg, and it wouldn't make sense to the Court to — to divide income
equally.
She's still relatively young, and even thought it's a 30-year marriage,
she has the ability to work, as was testified to by an expert. And the Court
will find that she's going to have to do that in order to make ends meet.
The Court will find that he makes $82,055, and I'm going to use a
figure of 75 percent that he would see after taxes, divided by 12 would be
$5, 128.43. If you take from that the alimony, the $1,300 that leaves him
with $3, 828.43.
I'm going to find that he has reasonable expenses of $3,207. I — it
looked to me like he has counted travel twice. He's got $400 for travel, and
then he has a whole a lot of expenses for a vehicle and other such
circumstances. And so I'll find that he has the ability to pay an additional
$600 in alimony.
She has needs of $2,238. She's currently received alimony in the
amount of $1,300, which leaves a need of $938. If I give her an addition
$600 a month in alimony, that will leave her with -- short about $338, and
the Court will find that she has sufficient ability to even get a part-time job to supplement

that income. That would make her whole.
The Court finds that this is a compromise between the — the actual
splitting of income and the — only giving her exactly -- well, it's — it's —
giving her what was previously ordered of $1,300.
The Court finds that she has more needs than that, even though she
has the ability to work, and so it's somewhat of a compromise. This is a
30-year marriage, and the Court needs to take into consideration that.

5

And so the Court will order a total of $1,900 per month, to be paid
beginning with the month of may and thereafter for the term of the
marriage; 30 years.
And I believe that's all that I was asked to determine.
Exhibit "A" at 4:25 - 7:5 (emphasis added).
From this excerpt from the court's ruling, it is clear that, although the court did not
make a finding regarding the specific dollar amount that Jenifer could earn, it did consider
her earning capacity. The court specifically found that Jenifer's needs were $2,238. In
spite of this fact, the court awarded her alimony of only $1,900. The court found that she
had the capacity to earn a sufficient amount to make up the difference.
In the court's ruling in this matter, it is also clear that the court is trying to
incorporate some of the other factors in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8) into its ruling. The
court specifically mentions the need to equalize the parties' standard of living and the
need to take into account the length of the parties' marriage.
Furthermore, it appears that Jeff simply expects the court to accept his expert's
testimony regarding Jenifer's ability to earn a living. In taking this position, Jeff expects
the court to ignore obvious problems with the expert's testimony. The expert admitted
that the only conversation she had with Jenifer was a five- to ten-minute telephone
conversation with Jenifer on the phone. The expert also admitted that she had completed
none of the vocational testing which she usually completes with people she is examining in
order to make a vocational evaluation. See Transcript at 163. Given these admitted
failings, it is obvious that the expert's opinion had no substantial basis-although the expert
6

may have had some expertise the area of vocational assessments, she had not taken the
steps which even she acknowledged were necessary to adequately apply that expertise.
Under those circumstances, the court would have been entirely justified in ignoring the
expert's opinion. The court did not choose to do this—the court relied on the expert to
conclude that Jenifer could work, but placed an appropriately minimal emphasis on the
expert's conclusions about Jenifer's earning potential.
Because the trial court adequately considered Jenifier's earning potential, there was
no error and the trial court's determination of alimony.
II.

THE C O U R T JUSTIFIED ITS EXCLUSION OF JEFF'S
TRAVEL EXPENSE.

Jeffs second issue on this appeal is that the trial court excluded an expense which
he claimed for $400 per month in travel expenses. Jeff claims that the court provided no
justification for its action and that the exclusion of this expense therefore represents
reversible error.
A review of the court's ruling in this matter, however, indicates that the trial court
did justify its exclusion of the travel expense. The trial court specifically stated
I—it looked to me like he had counted travel twice. He's got $400 for travel,
and then he has a whole lot of expenses for vehicle and other such
circumstances.
Exhibit "A" at 6:5-7.
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Based on the court's conclusion that Jeff h a d double-counted his travel expenses,
the exclusion of the $400 in travel expenses was justified and there was no abuse of the
trial court's discretion is determining Jeffs expenses.
Although the court's justification for excluding the travel expense was not included
in the court's Findings of Fact, this omission must be laid at Jeffs feet. Jeffs attorney was
given the responsibility for preparing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See
Exhibit "A" at 7:8-10. It would be unjust to allow Jeff to leave out one of the court's
findings in preparing the documents a n d then claim the omission as an error which would
justify the reversal of the court's decision. See N e w m a n v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008
U T 79, ^fl4,

P.3d

("The invited error doctrine prohibits parties from 'taking

advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error') (citing Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 U T 37, ^12, 163
P.3d615).
In this matter, Jeff led the trial court into omitting its finding on his travel expenses
by failing to include that finding in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law he
prepared for the court's signature. H e cannot take advantage of that error to win a
reversal of the court's decision on that matter. T h e court should therefore disregard Jeffs
claim of error in the matter of the exclusion of his travel expenses.
CONCLUSION
T h e trial court did not commit reversible error. Although the trial court did not
make a finding of the exact dollar amounl that Jenifer could have earned, it is clear that
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the court adequately considered her earning capacity along with the other factors
described in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8) in making its alimony determination. Under the
invited error doctrine, Jeff cannot rely on the exclusion of the justification for the court's
decision to exclude his travel expenses when he prepared the document in which he
claims the error was made. For these reasons, the court should affirm the trial court's
alimony and expense determinations in this matter.
DATED this {% day of February, 2009.

Keith M. Backman
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellee
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this u
day of February, 2009,1 mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing brief to Robert A. Echard, attorney for respondent /
appellant, at 2491 Washington Boulevard #200, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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Hawks v. Hawks

*

16 May 2008

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is the time set for ruling

in the matter of Jennifer Hawks versus Jeff Hawks, case
No. 07470043.
This matter was heard at trial on May 15th.
The Petitioner was present represented by Mr. Keith
Bachman.

The Respondent was present represented by

Mr. Robert Echard.
The issues that the parties have not yet
agreed to -- I might indicate that they have agreed to
the splitting of the personal property and the
vehicles, each keeping what they have.
The retirement would be according to
Woodward formula, with a Quadra, except for the fact
that they each own -- or that -- together, the marital
assets -- in the marital assets, there are two homes,
and each is occupying one.

And they've agreed that

each would keep the one that they are occupying.
It appears, from the appraisals, that the
home in Lay -- that the Petitioner is occupying is
worth approximately -- let's see.

-- it must be 60 --

69,000, I believe .
Of which she would owe to the —

to the

Petitioner half of that amount, of $34,500.
The parties propose that the difference in
3
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1

value of the real property be offset in the retirement

\13:46:48

2

accounts.

\l3:46:52

3
4

5

The Petitioner wants just $34,000 to be
Offset .

\i3:46:54
Ii3;47:0i

The Respondent has argued and brought an

|J3:47.-03

\i3:47:07

6

expert to indicate that Mr. Hawks would suffer a tax

7

penalty of -- or a -- would suffer taxes as a result of

IJ3.-47.-J3

8 I

drawing out the retirement, and it would make the

IJ3:47;J9

9

$34,500 equivalent to $53,077.

10

\i3-47:25

The accountant also pointed out that she may

m-47;35

111

sell the home without any tax consequences, so it seems

\i3-47:4i

12

only fair to the Court that the tax impact ought to be

\13:47:44

13

considered, and that the amount of retirement account

\13.47:49

14

to be -- that would offset the $34,500 difference would

\13.47:58

15

be $53,077, and the Court will order that.

16 I

Let me go back to the beginning and indicate

hj.^fi.-cs
J3:4<9;i7

17

that the parties both testified that they met the

\13:48:22

18

jurisdictional grounds; they were residents of Davis

\13:48:27

19

county and had been for the requisite period prior to

i3:45:34

20

filing the divorce.

lJ3.-45.-4J

21

That there were irreconcilable differences.

\l3:48:42

22

The Court will find that there were irreconcilable

113:48:49

23

differences and will award each a decree of divorce

i3:4<9'57

24

based upon those differences.

\i3:49-oi

25

The only other issue before the Court is the

\l3:49-06

Hawks v. Hawks
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issue of alimony.
The defendant makes approximately $82,000
per year, and the Respondent -- excuse me.
Petitioner makes, at this point, zero.
makes approximately $82,055.

The

The Respondent

Petitioner argued that

the -- his -- that the Respondent's income ought to be
split, and Petitioner -- or Respondent argued that
there ought to be some imputed income to her.
The Court, as it looks at the budget, finds
that the Respondent -- excuse me, the Petitioner has
the ability to work and to earn some income, and if the
Respondent -- or if the Court were to split the
Respondent's income right down the middle, that there
would -- he would not have sufficient income to satisfy
his needs.

It's like killing the goose that laid the

golden egg, and it wouldn't make sense to the Court
to -- to divide income equally.
She's still relatively young, and even
though it's a 30-year marriage, she has the ability to
work, as was testified to by an expert.

And the Court

will find that she's going to have to do that in order
to make ends meet.
The Court will find that he makes $82,055,
and I'm going to use a figure of 75 percent that he
would see after taxes, divided by 12 would be
5
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11

$5,128.43.

2

$1,300, that leaves him with $3,828.43.

\13:53:04

If you take from that the alimony, the

3

\13:53:10
\13:53:14

I'm going to find that he has reasonable

4

expenses of $3,207.

5

counted travel twice.

6

then

7

other such circumstances.

8

the

he h a s

ability

9

a whole

\i3:53:37

He's got $400 for travel, and

lot

of e x p e n s e s

for a v e h i c l e

And so I'll

to pay an a d d i t i o n a l

$600

She has needs of $2,238.
alimony

113:53:27

I --- it looked to me like he had

in a l i m o n y .

Ji3:54;25

She's currently

12

month

13

about $338, and the Court will find that she has

J3.-55:0^

14

sufficient

ability

job to

i3;55;09

15

supplement

that

her w h o l e .

|J3:55:i3

in a l i m o n y ,

that

will

to e v e n

income.

The C o u r t

finds

an a d d i t i o n a l

leave

get

That

which

i3;54:3<?

a need

If I g i v e h e r

$1,300,

\13:54:22

11

16 J

of

find that he has

received

$938.

amount

|iJ;53:4J

10 I

of

in t h e

and

her w i t h

a part-time
would make

that

this

leaves

$600 a

Ii3;54:39
•

-- s h o r t

J3;54;5J
i3;54:57

is a c o m p r o m i s e

JJ3:55:i7

17

between the -- the actual splitting of income and

\13:55:22

18

the -- only giving her exactly -- well, it's -- it's --

\l3:55:27

19 I

giving

her w h a t was p r e v i o u s l y

20

The C o u r t
though

she h a s

that
the

of

$1,300.

she has m o r e

21

that,

22 J

it's somewhat of a compromise.

23

marriage, and the Court needs to take into

24

consideration

25

even

finds

ordered

ability

needs

to w o r k ,

and

This is a 30-year

that.

And so the Court will order a total of

JJ3;55;3P
than
so

|i3;55:4£
i3:55:45

J3:55:4<9
i3:55;5<?
|J3:55:54

\i3:55-54
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$1,900 per month, to be paid beginning with the month
of May and thereafter for the term of the marriage;
30 years.
And I believe that's all that I was asked to
determine.
Each party will pay their own attorneys'
fees.

They have sufficient assets in their retirement

accounts if they need to take those.

And they -- I'll

ask Mr. Echard if he'll prepare a findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce.
And also, the two attorneys are ordered to
get together and to make a final determination as to
what retirement accounts there are, both hers and his,
and they're each to be split according to the Woodward
formula.
And I'll ask Mr. Backman if he won't prepare
a Quadra that would satisfy the -- the requirements of
the law.
I believe that that's all I have, and so
this concludes the ruling for this matter.
Thank you very much, counsel.
(Whereupon, the recording
was concluded.)
*

*

*

REPORTER'S

1

CERTIFICATE

2
3

STATE OF UTAH

4

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss

5
6

I, Debra A. Dibble, Registered

Professional

7

Reporter for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that

8

the foregoing transcript was taken down by me

9

stenographically from electronically recorded

10
11

tapes

and thereafter transcribed under my direction.
That the foregoing pages contain a true and

12

accurate transcript of the electronically

recorded

13

proceedings, or requested portions thereof, and was

14

transcribed by me to the best of.my ability from the

15

tapes given me.

16
1 /< »^rJ--.

D E B R A A. D I B B L E

\ "^'-''"

NOTARY PUBLIC - STAT EOF UTAH
41 50 WOODLAND VIEW DR.
WOODLAND UT 84036
M y C o m m Exp 02/07/2011 |

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

|

^s:
Debra A. Dibble, CSR, RPR

